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Abstract: I contrast two modes of error-elimination relevant to evaluating
evidence in accounts that emphasize frequentist reliability. The contrast
corresponds to that between the use of of a reliable inference procedure and
the critical scrutiny of a procedure with regard to its reliability, in light of
what is and is not known about the setting in which the procedure is used.
I propose a notion of security as a category of evidential assessment for the
latter. In statistical settings, robustness theory and misspecification testing
exemplify two distinct strategies for securing statistical inferences.
Contents
1 Introduction 2
2 Reliable indicators 4
3 Security in the evaluation of evidence claims 8
4 Security through robust statistics 11
4.1 Huber’s minimax approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2 Hampel’s influence function/breakdown point approach . . . 15
5 Security through misspecification testing 21
1
6 What next? 29
7 Appendix 32
7.1 The weak topology and distance measures . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.2 Definitions of IF-related concepts and breakdown point . . . 33
7.3 The Normal autoregressive model and testing independence . 34
1 Introduction
I highlight a distinction between two notions of error elimination at work
in the error-statistical (ES) philosophy of scientific evidence advocated by
Deborah Mayo, and discuss the methodological implications of that distinc-
tion. The shift between these two notions is connected with a shift from the
context in which a model is used to that in which it is criticized. Corre-
spondingly, they are distinguishable in that one notion is unrelatived, while
the other relative to epistemic situation.
ES proposes that evidence derives from testing procedures that con-
stitute severe error probes. In statistical settings, ES employs a modified
version of Neyman-Pearson Theory (NPT). Like NPT, the error-statistical
approach uses probability distributions as models of the reliability of test-
ing procedures, i.e., the rate at which they yield specific types of errors.
Roughly, good tests in the ES view are those with appropriately low rates
of error in indicating discrepancies from a family of competing hypotheses
under consideration, and good evidence for a hypothesis results from the
appropriate use of good tests. Mayo writes, “Data in accordance with hy-
pothesis H indicate the correctness of H to the extent that the data result
from a procedure that with high probability would have produced a result
more discordant with H, were H incorrect” (Mayo 1996, 445n). Putting this
idea in more schematic terms, the ES theory of evidence can be articulated
in terms of Mayo’s ‘severe test’ requirement: Supposing that hypothesis H
is subjected to test procedure T , resulting in data E, E constitutes evidence
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for H just in case:
SR1 E fits H, and
SR2 the probability of H passing T with an outcome such as E (i.e., one
that fits H at least as well as E does), given that H is false, is very
low (Mayo 1996, esp. 178–87).
The features of testing procedures (their error rates) that probability
statements are meant to capture in this context are putatively objective
features that obtain or not independently of what is known or believed
by any individual. That a particular probability distribution is an adequate
model of such features is a judgment that the researcher must make from the
perspective of her epistemic situation; it is held as a virtue of the approach
that such judgments are themselves potentially erroneous (they may fail
to correspond to the facts) but also corrigible (further testing, if carried
out reliably, will probably bring judgment into closer correspondence to the
facts).
Here I seek to articulate an additional dimension of epistemic ap-
praisal, which I call security, to complement that embodied in the ES ac-
count of evidence, and to relate that dimension to efforts in theoretical
statistics to systematize the critical assessment of model assumptions. In
particular, I consider the development of robust statistics and the program
of misspecification testing/model respecification as two modes of response,
in the context of model criticism, to the problem of insecure evidence.
I proceed as follows: In section two I seek to clarify the epistemic char-
acter of ES evidence by situating it within what I call a “reliable indicator”
view of evidence. A central characteristic of reliability in these accounts
is that it is to be understood in terms of frequencies of various types of
error. In section three I contrast two perspectives on claims about ES evi-
dence, insofar as these involve reliability. Roughly put, it is the distinction
between whether a reliability claim is true, a matter of fact that is unrel-
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ativized to any epistemic situation, and whether a given agent is justified
in making an evidence claim. I argue that the latter is not only relativized
to epistemic situation, but that it involves a category of epistemic appraisal
distinct from reliability. I propose a definition for this category of epistemic
appraisal, which I call the security of inferences or evidence claims. Section
four surveys some work in the field of robust statistics, which I present as a
theoretical approach to securing inferences by means of a strategy of weak-
ening one’s conclusions. In section five I discuss the contrasting approach
of misspecification testing, presented as an example of security through the
strengthening of support for premises. I conclude in section six by consid-
ering the prospects for a systematic approach to security, focusing on the
lessons that we might draw from work in robustness theory and misspecifi-
cation testing.
2 Reliable indicators
In this section, I present Mayo’s ES account of scientific evidence as a reliable
indicator (RI) account. By this I mean that it incorporates two related yet
distinct conceptual dimensions: reliability and semiotic function. Both of
these can be understood as characteristics of the testing procedures from
which ES evidence derives.
Consider a rather ordinary kind of reliable indicator: a magnetic com-
pass. In describing a particular compass as a reliable indicator, I indicate
that, used appropriately, one can take the direction of its needle as indicating
the approximate direction of magnetic north (this is its semiotic function),
and that in doing so, one would not at all often draw the wrong conclu-
sion in this regard (this is reliability). Obviously, reliability is a matter of
degree. Moreover, whether we choose to call a particular indicator reliable
will rest on contextual matters: a degree of reliability sufficient for find-
ing one’s way back to the trail head may not suffice for guiding a nuclear
submarine through a coral reef. That said, whether a particular indicator is
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sufficiently reliable to meet a particular standard is an objective matter with
a dual basis in the physical functioning of the device itself and the procedure
employed in arriving at conclusions on the basis of that functioning.
The ES account of evidence can be thought of as a kind of general-
ization of the way in which we use such every-day devices. Although ES
evidence is not restricted to contexts in which quantitative statistical mea-
sures are employed, an overtly statistical example may help to make the
conceptual components most apparent, as well as pave the way for the dis-
cussion robust statistical estimation to come.
Suppose that we are interested in estimating the “location parame-
ter” µx for a distribution function F governing a series of random variables
X1, X2, . . . , Xn. We know that F is normal, with unknown mean µx and
unknown variance σ20. We might follow the standard instructions for con-
structing a confidence interval as such: First, we use as an estimator for the
population mean µx the sample mean x¯ = n−1
∑n
1 xi, and as an estimator
for the population variance the sample variance s2x = (n−1)−1
∑n
i (xi− x¯)2.
Now, suppose that we already know what standard of reliability we have in
mind. For example, we might want to make the estimate by means of an
instrument with no greater than a 5% error rate. Using the quantities x¯ and
sx¯ = n−1/2sx (the standard deviation of the sample mean), and with the
help of a statistical table giving t-variate probabilities, one can determine
a confidence interval with just that characteristic. Specifically, it can be
shown that, under these assumptions,
Pr(x¯− tα/2sx¯ < µx < x¯+ tα/2sx¯) = 1− α. (1)
Supposing then that we let α = 0.05 and that n = 20, this becomes
Pr(x¯− 2.093sx¯ < µx < x¯+ 2.093sx¯) = 0.95. (2)
This result derives from the distribution of the estimator itself, under
the assumed underlying distribution F , and can be understood as follows:
The method of constructing an interval estimate just described is such that
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95% of the intervals thus constructed will include the true value of the
location parameter µx. Our conclusion might then be that the data give
evidence that µx = x¯± 2.093sx¯.
Here again, as in the example of the compass, we have a semiotic
function (i.e., the interval constructed) which is an indicator that points to
a range of possible values for µx. Moreover, the limiting of the probability
of error can serve to ensure the reliability of this semiotic function. The
test’s semiotic function and its reliability are determined by the probabilistic
dependence on the value of µx of the values recorded for x1, x2, . . . , xn and
by the appropriate choice of an estimator (itself in turn dependent on those
same values) so as to achieve the requisite limits on error rates. As in the case
of the compass, the appropriate standard of reliability may be contextual,
but whether the standard is met by the test as constituted is an objective
matter in that it is independent of what anyone knows or believes about the
test or the hypotheses under consideration.
To put the point differently, the investigator employing a particular
statistical testing procedure judges its reliability by means of the probability
values calculated according to the statistical model employed (in the present
example, this model includes the use of the normal distribution, for exam-
ple). That the model used is an adequate representation of the relevant
aspects of the testing procedure is a judgment made by the investigator. It
is precisely because reliable semiotic function is an objective matter that
there is always the possibility of such a judgment being in error. Moreover,
as emphasized by Mayo, such errors themselves may be discovered and cor-
rected. Therefore, those claims about the evidence relevant to a particular
hypothesis that depend on such tests are also susceptible to error — and
those errors, too, may be discovered and corrected. Mayo quotes approv-
ingly Henry Kyburg’s assertion that this possibility of error is “almost a
touchstone of objectivity” (Kyburg 1993, 147, quoted in Mayo 1996, 83).
Thus, the first notion of error-elimination at work in the ES account is
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the notion of using a severe error probe, i.e., a rule for drawing conclusions
about hypotheses via the evidence given by experimentally-generated data
that, when applied to hypotheses about a particular question, would only
rarely lead one to infer a conclusion, supposing it to be false. It is this that
allows the investigator to draw an inference with the assurance that she
has, with high probability, ruled out an erroneous conclusion. Determining
whether a given testing procedure meets that severity standard requires
relying on some assumptions. The problem can be seen most clearly in the
kind of quantitative statistical context exemplified in the estimation example
given above, where the relevant assumptions serve to define a statistical
model. In such cases, the distinction at issue is that between using the
model and criticizing it. Two questions immediately arise concerning model
criticism. First, what does it mean for a model to be adequate? Second,
how can one establish the adequacy of a model?
I propose here to show how a notion of error-elimination distinct from
the severe-test notion just mentioned plays a central role both in character-
izing model adequacy and in the evaluation of statistical models (hence also
in the evaluation of evidence claims that rely upon such models).
The kind of uncertainty that is addressed by error probabilities is of
the following sort: Is the procedure presently used to draw conclusions one
that is very often leads to errors? How probable is it, given the procedure
at hand, that one will draw an incorrect conclusion? The researcher’s sit-
uation is also characterized by uncertainty of a different sort, which model
criticism seeks to address: What are the various ways in which error might
arise, and which are ruled out by what is already known? Answers to these
questions are necessarily relative to epistemic situation of the researcher in
a way that error rates are not. Or, to put it in another light, ES evidential
relations, being independent of epistemic situations, enjoy a more robust
objectivity than evidential claims, the epistemic status of which is relative
to some epistemic situation.1 In the next section I will elaborate on this
1Note that this is a different distinction than that drawn by Peter Achinstein between
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point, introducing a concept that will help to clarify the nature of the latter
perspective on the epistemic status of evidence claims.
3 Security in the evaluation of evidence claims
The viewpoint of the researcher making an evidential judgment thus brings
into perspective two distinct notions of error elimination not previously dis-
tinguished by ES advocates. The first is unrelativized: testing procedures
have their error rates independently of our judgments about them. One
eliminates error by using a procedure that as a matter of fact rarely leads
to false conclusions, a matter that is independent of ones epistemic situa-
tion. The second is relativized: one eliminates error by showing that, given
what one knows, the ways in which ones premises or underlying assumptions
might be wrong can be ruled out, or else make no difference to the evidential
conclusion one is drawing.
I propose a division of labor between these two notions. In accordance
with ES, the first, unrelativized notion of frequency reliability is appropriate
to the concept of evidence itself. The second notion is appropriate for the
appraisal of claims about evidence (or reliability). I employ the term security
for this latter concept.
The concept of security that I develop is meant to capture an intuitive
notion regarding how investigators make claims about evidence. Let an
evidence claim be a claim of the form ‘Data E (resulting from test T ) are
evidence for the hypothesis that H.’ At the time that such a claim is made,
the claimant will believe or rely upon many propositions, some of which,
for all she knows, may be wrong. Assuming she does not want to make an
relativized and unrelativized evidence concepts (Achinstein 2001). Achinstein’s point is
that evidence concepts of both kinds are invoked on different occasions by scientists, a
point that I do not dispute. My point is that, even restricting ourselves to the kind of
unrelativized evidence concept that is the subject of the ES theory, the epistemic status
(as opposed to simply the truth) of evidence claims using that unrelativized concept is
relative to epistemic situation.
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evidence claim that might subsequently be refuted, she has reason therefore
to consider the ways in which her claim might fail. More specifically, she
should, I argue, wish for her evidence claims to be secure in the following
sense:
Definition 1 (secure evidence) Suppose that Ω0 is the set of all epistem-
ically possible scenarios relative to epistemic situation K, and Ω1 ⊆ Ω0. An
evidence claim C is secure throughout Ω1 relative to K iff for any scenario
ω ∈ Ω1, C is true. If C is secure throughout Ω0 then it is fully secure.2
Before proceeding, some explanation of terminology is in order. Fol-
lowing Chalmers (2008), I use the term scenario to refer to what might be
intuitively thought of as a “maximally specific way things might be.” In
practice, no one ever considers scenarios as such, of course, but rather fo-
cuses on salient differences between scenario and another. Scenarios thus
function rather like possible worlds, although here the relevant modality is
distinct from the subjunctive use to which possible worlds are typically put.
The modality of interest here is epistemic possibility, which can be
thought of as the modality invoked in such expressions as “For all I know,
there might be a third-generation leptoquark with a rest of mass of 250
GeV/c2” and “ For all I know, I might have left my sunglasses on the train.”
Hintikka, whose (1962) provides the origins for contemporary discussions,
took expressions of the form “It is possible, for all that S knows, that P”
to have the same meaning as “It does not follow from what S knows that
not-P .” Just how to formulate the semantics of such statements is, however,
contested (see, e.g., DeRose 1991 and Chalmers 2008).3 The central claims
2There may be reasons for the investigator to consider someone else’s epistemic situa-
tion to be more relevant than her own. The choice of the relevant epistemic situation for
a given evidence claim is an outstanding problem of the theory of secure reasoning.
3To note one difficulty for Hintikka’s original understanding, consider the status of
mathematical theorems. Arguably, if Goldbach’s conjecture is true, then it does follow
from what I know (though I do not realize this), if I know the axioms of number theory.
Yet it also seems correct to say that it is possible, for all I know, that Goldbach’s conjecture
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of the present proposal are independent of disputed issues regarding the
semantics of epistemic possibility.
Finally, the notion of an epistemic situation is borrowed from Achin-
stein (2001), who describes an epistemic situation as a situation in which
“among other things, one knows or believes that certain propositions are
true, one is not in a position to know or believe that others are, and one
knows (or does not know) how to reason from the former to the hypothesis”
(ibid., 20). To this I would add as components of the epistemic situation that
one knows (or does not know) how to do things (such as the manipulation
of data or instruments, or the performance of speech acts) that facilitate the
inference from data and other propositions to the hypothesis of interest.
The basic idea is that an evidence claim is secure for an agent to the
extent that it holds true across a range of scenarios that are epistemically
possible for that agent. Exactly which scenarios are epistemically possible
for a given epistemic agent is opaque, and not all epistemically possible
scenarios are equally relevant, so the methodologically significant concept
turns out to be relative security : An investigator can make her evidence
claim more secure either by decreasing the range of epistemically possible
scenarios so as to exclude some in which her claim is false, or by expanding,
across the range of possible scenarios, the scope of those in which the claim
she makes is true.
I contend that numerous scientific practices already aim at enhancing
the security of evidence claims.We can tentatively classify such practices
within some broad categories, such as strategies for weakening an evidential
conclusion, for strengthening the support for assumptions employed in eval-
uating evidence, and for arguing from robustness, in the sense of appealing
to convergent results from independent tests (Staley 2004).4
is false, even if I do know the axioms of number theory.
4It appears to be an unfortunate coincidence that the term ‘robust’ and its cognates
enters this discourse in two rather distinct roles, one coming from philosophy of science,
and the other from statistics. Here the emphasis will be on the sense of the term as used
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The present paper focuses on the strengthening and weakening strate-
gies (see Staley 2004 and 2008b for a discussion of the robustness strategy).
The security framework here proposed allows for a unified understanding of
these strategies. In weakening, the conclusion of an evidential inference is
logically weakened in such a way as to remain true across a broader range of
epistemically possible scenarios than the original conclusion. Strengthening
strategies operate by adding to knowledge, reducing the overall space of epis-
temically possible scenarios so as to eliminate some in which the conclusion
of the evidential inference would be false.
In what follows I survey the pursuit of these two strategies through two
developments within theoretical statistics. The first of these is robust statis-
tics, a branch of mathematical statistics that has received little attention
from philosophers of science. The second is the program of misspecification
testing (M-S) and model respecification advocated by Aris Spanos (1999)
and by Mayo and Spanos (2004) from a standpoint firmly within the error-
statistical approach. The first can be viewed as an example of a weakening
strategy, while the latter operates by strengthening. I argue that viewing
both approaches as efforts to address the problem of securing evidence claims
yields insight into the evaluation of scientific knowledge.
4 Security through robust statistics
In this section, I argue that the development of robust statistics serves as
an example of how security considerations can guide (even if implicitly) the
development of rigorous theoretical frameworks with epistemic advantages
over their non-secure counterparts.
Robust statistics originates in the insight that many classical statisti-
cal procedures depend upon parametric models that may hold only approxi-
mately. Although one might hope that when those models are approximately
valid, so are the conclusions drawn, this is often not the case. In an oft-cited
by statisticians.
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and clever paper, Tukey (1960) considered the following situation, prompted
by his work at the end of World War II analyzing data on the effectiveness of
bomber machine-gun fire against attacking fighters. Suppose there are two
normal populations with identical means, but where the standard deviation
of one is three times larger than another, and suppose that a large sample
of data is generated from a population that is a mixture of the narrower
population with some small “contamination” from the wider population.
(Then, of course, the population sampled is no longer described by a single
normal distribution; the contamination data might be thought of as outliers
relative to the original narrower distribution.) Suppose, further, that one
wishes to estimate the scale parameter for the population sampled. Tukey
notes that for a normal distribution, the relative efficiency of the mean devi-
ation as compared to the standard deviation, as estimators of scale, is 88%.
But he shows that, not only does the addition of contributions from the
wider distribution to the narrower distribution render the mean deviation
more efficient, but that the point at which the mean deviation just matches
the standard deviation in efficiency is when a mere .008 of the population
sampled comes from the wider distribution.
What Tukey’s discussion shows is that, in spite of the fact that much
of statistical practice rests on the use of statistical measures the properties
of which are determined under the assumption that some parametric sta-
tistical model of the population holds exactly, small departures from such
an exact model can have dramatic effects on the performance of such mea-
sures. In particular, theorists have been concerned with three reasons why
a parametric model might fail to hold exactly (Hampel et al. 1986):
1. Rounding of observations
2. Occurrence of gross errors (bad data entry, instrument malfunction,
etc.)
3. Idealization or approximation in the model
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Awareness of these problems significantly pre-dates Tukey’s work. As
Stephen Stigler notes, “Scientists have been concerned with what we would
call ‘robustness’ – insensitivity of procedures to departures from assump-
tions . . . for as long as they have been employing well-defined procedures,
perhaps longer” (Stigler 1973, 872).5 Statisticians continue to use the term
‘robustness’ to refer broadly to this notion of insensitivity, and there are
several theoretical approaches to the development of frameworks for robust
statistical inference. Here I will survey some influential robustness notions
that originated in the 1960s in work by Peter Huber (1964) and Frank Ham-
pel (1968; 1971; 1974).
Many theoretical advances have been made since that early work, and
robustness has been extended beyond simple one-dimensional estimation
problems to multi-dimensional and testing contexts, but I will here simply
discuss some of the early developments on one-dimensional estimators. My
aim is not to survey the state of robust statistical theory, but to instead argue
that from the outset the theoretical work has been guided by a methodolog-
ical concern with the security of statistical conclusions, and that the theory
of robust statistics can serve as an exemplar for further systematic thinking
about security.
4.1 Huber’s minimax approach
In his groundbreaking 1964 paper, Peter Huber introduced a class of esti-
mators that he called “M -estimators.”6 Huber introduces these as a kind
of generalization of least-squares estimators. Consider, in our original ex-
ample attempting to estimate the location parameter of the distribution F ,
our choice of test statistic T = 1nΣixi. This emerges as the solution to a
5In the history of statistics, Stigler traces the first mathematical contributions to robust
estimation back to Laplace, but focuses on the work of Simon Newcomb and of P. J. Daniell
as exemplars of early work on robust estimation that was both clear and rigorous.
6Cf. Huber 1964. The discussion that follows also owes much to Hampel et al. 1986,
esp. 36–39, 172–78.
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problem of minimizing the sum of the squares of the differences between the
observed values and those that would be predicted under the hypothesis cho-
sen by that estimator (the “errors”). In other words, supposing T initially
to be some unspecified function of random variables x1, x2, . . . xn, we seek
to choose T so that Σi(xi − T )2 takes its minimum value. The solution to
this particular minimization problem is in fact to define T to be the sample
mean T = 1nΣixi.
The class of M-estimators is then introduced as those that solve the
more general problem of minimizing some function ρ of the errors (possibly
not the sum of their squares). I.e., M-estimators are those functions that
minimize Σiρ(xi − T ), for some non-constant function ρ.7 Huber’s motiva-
tion here is initially just that “It is quite natural to ask whether one can
obtain more robustness by minimizing another function of the errors” (Hu-
ber 1964, 74). Tukey and others had already noticed that other statistics
besides the mean performed better as location estimators when assumed
exact parametric models failed. Since the choice of the mean as a loca-
tion estimator could be defended on the grounds of it’s solving a particular
minimization problem, perhaps alternative, more robust estimators would
emerge as solutions to alternative, but related, minimization problems.
Of course, to determine whether this is the case, one needs some means
of evaluating robustness. Here it should be noted that Huber’s discussion is
not perfectly general, but assumes that the unknown underlying distribution
F can be represented in the form of a mixture of a normal distribution
Φ with another, possibly non-normal but symmetric distribution H: F =
(1− )Φ+ H. This is sometimes called a “model of indeterminacy.” (Note
that although H is assumed unknown,  is assumed to be known.) In this
setting, Huber opts to use the supremum of the asymptotic variance of an
estimator as an indicator of its robustness.
7As Huber notes, this class turns out to include as special cases the sample mean
(ρ(t) = t2), the sample median (ρ(t) =| t |), and all maximum likelihood estimators
(ρ(t) = −logf(t), where f is the assumed density of the distribution.
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More specifically: suppose that ψ is an estimator to be applied to
observations x1, x2, . . . , xn drawn from a family P of models that have the
form of F just given, for some value of  (call the resulting estimate ψn).
Then the asymptotic variance of ψ at a distribution G ∈P is understood
to be the expected value of the squares of the differences between estimator
values and the expected estimator values, evaluated at F0, as n → ∞, i.e.,
V (ψ,G) = En→∞[(ψn −E(ψn))2]. Then the most robust M-estimator for a
given family F of distributions would be that which minimizes the maximal
asymptotic variance across P. Huber’s approach, in other words, is to
select as most robust that M-estimator ψ0 that satisfies the condition:
sup
G∈P
V (ψ0, G) = min
ψ
sup
G∈P
V (ψ,G) (3)
Huber then goes on to show, among many other important results,
that the solution to this problem corresponds to determining first the “least
favorable distribution” F0, which is the distribution that minimizes the
Fisher information over all G ∈ P. The estimator that satisfies the ro-
bustness criterion above is then the maximum likelihood estimator for that
least favorable distribution. Intuitively, the approach is to pick the approach
that is the optimum choice for the “worst case scenario,” i.e., the scenario
in which the observed random variable is the least informative about the
value of the estimated parameter.
4.2 Hampel’s influence function/breakdown point approach
Beginning in his 1968 thesis and in a series of subsequent papers (Hampel
1968; 1971; 1974), Frank Hampel laid the foundations for the “infinitesimal”
approach to robust statistics, beginning as Huber did with one-dimensional
estimation problems. Huber’s approach begins by replacing the usual ex-
act parametric model with a model of indeterminacy (originally, a normal
distribution with a specified degree of “contamination”) and then seeks to
formulate a generalized minimization problem for that particular model,
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Hampel’s approach begins with an exact parametric model (not necessarily
normal) and then considers the behavior of estimators in “neighborhoods”
of that model.
First consider a qualitiative definition of robustness, as introduced
in Hampel (1971).8 Suppose that we consider a sequence of estimates
Tn = Tn(x1, x2, . . . , xn), where the xi are independent and identically dis-
tributed observations, with common distribution F . Let LF (Tn) denote the
distribution of Tn under F . The sequence Tn is robust at F = F0 iff, for a
suitable distance function d,9 for any  > 0, there is a δ > 0, and an n0 > 0,
such that for all distributions F and all n ≥ n0,
d(F0, F ) ≤ δ ⇒ d(LF0(Tn),LF (Tn)) ≤  (4)
To express qualitative robustness intuitively, Hampel’s definition re-
quires that an estimator be such that closeness of the assumed distribution
of the observations to their actual distribution ensures that the assumed
distribution of the estimator is close to its actual distribution.
Such a definition allows for the systematic use of the designation “ro-
bust,” but one might also wish to know how much difference a particular
error in one’s assumptions will make to the behavior of an estimator or test
statistic T . Hampel introduced the notion of the influence function (IF) to
address specifically the question of how much the value of T would change
with the addition of a single new data point with a particular value x. The
motivation seems in particular to have been to deal with questions of how to
handle gross errors that turn up as outliers in the data. (The sample mean,
for example, as a location estimate, responds dramatically to the addition
8The following discussion owes much to Huber 1981. Many technical details are omit-
ted, as the aim is to convey an intuitive notion that only approximates the more rigorous
mathematical approach taken by Hampel.
9Just what makes a function d “suitable” to be a distance function in this context is
not perfectly clear. See Huber 1981, 25–34, and the appendix for some functions that have
received the attention of theorists.
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of a single observation with x large relative to the rest of the sample.)
In his first publication on what he was then calling the “influence
curve,” after having introduced the notion in his 1968 dissertation, Hampel
described it as “essentially the first derivative of an estimator, viewed as a
functional, at some distribution” (Hampel 1974, 383). More specifically, the
following definition is the one Hampel gives for dealing with an estimator
functional T , a probability measure F on a subset of the real line R, and
x ∈ R:
IFT,F (x) = lim
↓0
T ((1− )F + δx)− T (F )

(5)
where δx denotes the pointmass 1 at x.
In practice, the importance of the influence function lies in various
derived quantities that serve as measures of different kinds of robustness.
Three of these deserve mention here, as they are adapted to quite distinct
worries involving robustness. The point I would like to emphasize about
these quantities is that they all seek to capture behaviors of estimators in
some kind of generic “worst-case scenario.” (Here I will only introduce them
with their intuitive interpretations. Mathematical definitions are given in
the appendix; all of their definitions involve the influence function.)
The first (“and most important,” according to Hampel et al. 1986, 87)
of these derived concepts is the gross-error senstivity γ∗, a measure of the
“worst (approximate) influence which a small amount of contamination of
fixed size can haver on the value of the estimator” (ibid., 87). The gross-error
sensitivity is thus useful for understanding how estimators react to outliers
or other “contamination” – what Hampel calls the results of “throwing in”
operations (Hampel 1974, 387).
A rather different concern motivates the use of the local-shift sensitiv-
ity λ∗. Here the concern is with the effects of small changes in the values of
observations, such as might result from either rounding or grouping of obser-
vations, among other sources. Supposing that one thinks of such a change
in terms of removing an observation at point x and replacing it with an
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observation at a neighboring point y, one can think of this as asking about
the change in the estimate brought about by such a change, standardized
by dividing out the difference between y and x. Local-shift sensitivity is
thus a a “measure for the worst (approximate and standardized) effect of
‘wiggling”’ (Hampel et al. 1986, 88; also Hampel 1974, 389).
Finally, the rejection point ρ∗ can be used to describe approaches to
estimation that simply reject outliers – the most time-honored approach to
robust estimation, whether based on “objective” or “subjective” criteria.
The rejection point can be thought of as the smallest absolute value that an
observation might have that would lead to its being rejected outright, thus
having no influence on the value of the estimate. If data are never to be
rejected, regardless of their value, then ρ∗ =∞.
It should be noted that the influence function and its associated ro-
bustness measures are all local in the sense that they are evaluated at a
particular distribution, with the effects of deviations from that distribution
evaluated in a piecemeal manner. In order to arrive at a global characteriza-
tion of an estimator, Hampel introduced the breadown point, a measure that
“describes up to what distance from the model distribution the estimator
still gives some relevant information” (Hampel et al. 1986, 96), in the sense
of “excluding part of the parameter space” (Hampel 1971, 1894). Hampel
has also stresed the usefulness of the breakdown point as guiding how far
from the assumed model F the IF can be used (Hampel et al. 1986, 41).
The theoretical interest of robustness theory in statistics derives from
its methodological significance: In practice, data analysis often uses estima-
tors or test statistics10 that do not behave at all like they are supposed to in
the presence of even small violations of the parametric models on which they
depend. Put another way, the reliability properties that are understood to
10Henceforth, in making general points about robustness theory, I shall refer only to
estimators. It must be born in mind that robustness theory has been developed for
testing as well as estimation and all the same general points obtain in that context, but
with attention shifted from the properties of estimators to those of test statistics.
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hold for these estimators are an indicator of the evidential strength provided
by the results of their application – but only if those properties really to hold.
In many situations in which calculations based on a parametric model at-
tribute such reliability properties to an estimator (and hence the results of
its application), the model does not in fact hold exactly, and in many of
those situations, the result is that the attributed reliability properties do
not even hold approximately.
Robust statistics responds to this problem by giving investigators
tools for evaluating how well statistical conclusions drawn with a partic-
ular claimed reliability hold up in the face of particular kinds of departures
from a given parametric model. Or, to put it in terms used in the definition
of security: robustness notions in statistics aim to allow the investigator to
determine and employ an estimator that would allow her evidence claims
to remain valid for various ways in which, for all she knows, her initial
(parametric statistical) assumptions might be wrong.
Without invoking security explicitly under the terms I have used to
characterize it, robustness theorists have shown how to treat problems of the
security of statistical inference in a systematic way. Specifically, the mathe-
matical frameworks above provide frameworks for building models of various
ways in which a particular parametric model used to calculate the long-run
error behavior of an estimator might fail, so as to permit understanding of
how such failure influences the behavior of that estimator. The particu-
lar robustness concepts developed seem to depend both on their suitability
for capturing the relevant aspects of prominent model-defeating scenarios
(gross errors, contamination, etc.) and on their mathematical tractability:
at least in principle, one can use these concepts for discussing the behavior
of estimators within such scenarios.
The general approach that the Huber/Hampel framework takes to
enhancing security is a weakening strategy: the security of the inference is
enhanced by weakening its conclusion. This can be seen very clearly by
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considering Hampel’s comparison of the robustness properties of the mean
to those of others at the Standard Normal distribution (Table 1, based on
a similar table in Hampel 1974). Apart from the local-shift sensitivity λ∗
(typically used to evaluate sensitivity to rounding errors), the mean fares
poorly in comparison to the robustness properties of some other common
estimators. It is the only one of these to fail to be qualitatively robust, and
has a strong susceptibility to gross errors. (Since none of these estimators
is defined to reject values on the basis of their magnitude as such, they
all have infinite rejection points.) However, the mean has one very strong
advantage at the Normal distribution, which is that its variance is so much
smaller, making it a much more efficient estimator than its more robust
counterparts.
As the emphasis in that last sentence indicates, this last advantage
is illusory if in fact the process generating data is not adequately modeled
using the Normal distribution. The use of a more robust estimator is then
a more secure choice for the inquirer who has assumed a statistical model
based on the Normal distribution, although for all she knows the process
might not be correctly described by a Normal distribution. The price paid
is that the less sharply distributed, but more more robust estimators will
in general lead to less precise estimates, making less efficient use of the
information in the data than one would if the Normal model were valid and
one used the mean as an estimator. The strategy is clearly a weakening one
in the sense that one draws a weaker conclusion (an estimate that results in a
larger interval for the same confidence level), but relies on what is implicitly
a “compound” or disjunctive premise: the conclusion is sound so long as
either the assumed model or an alternative that is “close” to it (in a sense
defined by the relevant robustness measure) is valid. The contrast between
weakening and strengthening will emerge more clearly as we turn in the next
section to an alternative strengthening strategy: rather than draw a weaker
conclusion that remains sound across a range of models of epistemically
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estimator qra σ2 γ∗ λ∗ ρ∗
mean − 1.00 ∞ 1.00 ∞
Hodges-Lehmannb + 1.047 1.77 1.41 ∞
median + 1.571 1.25 ∞ ∞
5% trimc + 1.026 1.83 1.11 ∞
10% trimd + 1.060 1.60 1.25 ∞
Table 1: Robustness properties of some common estimators at the Normal
distribution (based on Hampel 1974)
aqr = qualitative robustness
bmedian of pairwise means of observations
cmean after smallest/largest [.05n] observations are removed
dmean after smallest/largest [.10n] observations are removed
possible scenarios, focus on determining a statistically adequate model, and
then choose the optimal inferential strategy for that model.
A final note regarding these robustness notions. The basic strategy
employs models of error that incorporate their own assumptions. For exam-
ple, recall that Huber’s initial work on M-estimators used an error model
that assumed the contaminating distribution was symmetric, an assump-
tion unlikely to be exactly met in most applications. Of course, this was
an early attempt, and subsequent work by Huber and others has extended
the mathematical treatment of security to more general scenarios involving
much weaker assumptions. Nonetheless, the point remains that more defi-
nite statements regarding security can be made when one has more resources
for representing what one does not know.
5 Security through misspecification testing
As argued by Aris Spanos (2008), such robustness arguments suffer from two
disadvantages. The first is that just noted: applying the mathematical tools
of robustness theory typically requires considerable knowledge of the nature
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of the error in the original model, in particular the “form and structure of
potential misspecifications”. In the case where we lack such knowledge, those
tools are inapplicable and the tendency to invoke robustness nonetheless
leads to a “false sense of security” (ibid., 22). In the case we are able to
determine the nature of the problem, this will be precisely through some sort
of testing of the original model, just as advocated by the misspecification
testing ( M-S) approach, and the natural next step would be, not to use the
less efficient robust estimators, but to respecify the model and choose an
optimal estimator based on the new, statistically adequate model.
The second problem noted by Spanos is that both Huber’s minimax
approach and Hampel’s influence function approach are based on changes
in or distance measures applied to distributions as a whole – i.e., the as-
sumed vs. the actual distribution characterizing the asymptotic behavior
of estimators – when what is relevant to the evaluation of evidence in the
error-statistical setting is not the entire distribution, but rather the error
probabilities. Thus the basis for robustness assessment regarding claims
about error-statistical evidence should be the sensitivity of the error proba-
bilities to epistemically possible flaws in the assumed model.11
Thus, Spanos (1999; Mayo and Spanos 2004) argues that the appro-
priate strategy for addressing possible departures from assumed parametric
models is to carry out a systematic approach to testing those models (mis-
specification testing – M-S), replacing the model, if necessary, with one that
is more statistically adequately (model respecficiation).
A full explanation of the M-S testing approach would go beyond the
11Indeed, this is the way in which robustness often is considered when evaluating the
sensitivity of particular inferences to departures from model assumptions. Consider, for
example, G.E.P. Box’s (1953) demonstration that analysis of variance tests using Bartlett’s
modification of Neyman and Pearson’s L1 test that involve more than two variances are
very non-robust with regard to departures from Normality. The first table in the paper
shows, for various values of kurtosis, how the true probability of exceeding a nominal 0.05
significance level using Bartlett’s test statistic can vastly exceed 0.05, and the more so the
larger the number of variances being compared (Box 1953).
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aims of the present paper. My procedure here will be to discuss M-S testing
in general terms, with attention to its aims, and the theoretical appara-
tus it employs.12 The point I wish to emphasize is that M-S testing, like
the minimax and infinitesimal approaches to robustness, arises from the
need to address the security of evidence claims and their associated infer-
ences. Understanding the epistemological difficulty that M-S and robustness
theory aim to address will facilitate the evaluation of their quite different
approaches to the problem.
By its nature, M-S testing calls for testing outside of the original
parametric model. Indeed, because M-S aims to consider all possible distri-
butions as alternatives to that in the assumed model, it cannot proceed on
a fully parametric basis at all. As Spanos notes, “the implicit maintained
hypothesis [is] P, the set of all possible probability models,” including non-
parametric models (ibid., 733, emphasis in original). This poses a difficulty,
however. One might attempt to carry out a test of the assumed model by
treating it as a null that can be specified parametrically, thus defining a sub-
set Bθ ⊂ P, but given the absence of a parametrization of the alternative
P −Bθ, one seems to be forced into testing in an ad hoc and local manner,
with no framework for evaluating the power of such tests. The situation
seems to demand a Fisherian approach to testing in which the aim is really
to subject the null hypothesis to testing, but without the specification of
an alternative hypothesis (apart from the implicit alternative that the true
distribution lies withinP−Bθ), thus leading one only to conclusions about
how compatible the data are with the null. Yet one would also like to be able
to systematize one’s search for possible departures from the assumed model
in a way that allows one to judge sensitivity of the test to such departures.
Spanos proposes to solve this difficulty by strategically employing a se-
ries of pseudo-Neyman-Pearson tests of the assumed model that situate that
model within an “encompassing” statistical model, not as a true Neyman-
12The discussion here follows closely that of Spanos (1999, 729–65).
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Pearson test, but as a kind of ansatz to allow for the kind of operationaliza-
tion of testing that a strict Fisher-type test does not allow. In other words,
rather than ad hoc scrutiny of single assumptions, Spanos’s M-S testing
approach uses techniques of data analysis (largely graphical) to look for
“specific directions of possible departures from the assumptions of the pos-
tulated model” (ibid., 763). Based on such information, one then postulates
a new model that includes the original model as a special (null) case, and
tests within the enlarged model for departures from that null. This allows
for the full parametrization of the M-S test, as required in Neyman-Pearson
approaches. Nonetheless, Spanos insists, these are not true Neyman-Pearson
tests because the context is one in which one is explicitly open to the pos-
sibility that the true model lies outside, not only the original postulated
model, but also outside the encompassing model. Moreover, the “basic ob-
jective” of M-S testing is that of Fisherian testing: “The significance level α,
interpreted in terms of what happens in the long run when the experiment
is repeated a large number of times, is irrelevant because the question the
modeler poses concerns the particular sample realization” (ibid., 764).
The statistical model in our example was the simple Normal model
and comprises probabilistic assumptions falling into three categories. Re-
garding distribution, the model assumes that random variables X1, . . . , Xn
are allNormally distributed. The dependence assumption is thatX1, . . . , Xn
are probabilistically Independent. Finally, the model assumption regard-
ing heterogeneity is that all random variables X1, . . . , Xn are Identically
Distributed (hence the abbreviation NIID). The aim of M-S would then
be to use the data in hand to test these assumptions against their alter-
natives: that X1, . . . , Xn are not Normally distributed, that some of them
are probabilistically dependent on others, that they are not all identically
distributed.
In the present case, then, the M-S testing approach of specifying an
encompassing statistical model that includes the original postulated model
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as a special case might lead one to replace the Independence assumption
with an assumption that allows for Markov dependence. Suppose that we
use notation f(x;θ) to denote a density function of random variable X with
parameters θ, that T is the “index set” used to represent the dimension
according to which the data are ordered, and that R is the Borel σ-field
generated by the real numbers R). Whereas the initial independence as-
sumption regarding {X} could be expressed in terms of the identity
f(x1, x2, . . . , xT ;φ) =
T∏
i=1
ft(xt;ψt) for all t ∈ T,
and all x := (x1, . . . , xT ) ∈ R, (6)
our new assumption would be that of Markov dependence:
fk(xk|xk−1, xk−2, . . . , x1;φk) = fk(xk|xk−1;ψk), k = 2, 3, . . . . (7)
Consistency then requires us also to replace the original heterogeneity as-
sumption of identical distribution with that of second-order stationarity. We
then have the following statistical generating model :
Xt = α0 + α1Xt−1 + ut, t ∈ T (8)
(here ut is the error term).
These modifications amount to the specification of an encompassing
model (the Normal autoregressive model) that allows one to carry out a
test of the hypothesis H0: that (X1, X2, . . . , XT ) are independent against
the alternative H1: that they are Markov dependent. In parametric terms
this is a matter of testing H0 : α1 = 0 against H1 : α1 6= 0. As Spanos
explains, the optimal test here is a t-test using an appropriately defined test
statistic (see appendix for details). Moreover, the Normal autoregressive
model can easily be extended to capture higher order Markov dependence,
thus allowing for an optimal test of the null against such alternatives by
means of the F-test (ibid., 757–60).
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This brings us naturally to the question of what to do with the results
of such tests. Although the mathematical apparatus is precisely that of
the Neyman-Pearson approach that is directed at underwriting the kind of
reliable indicator evidence claims at the heart of the ES approach, the aims
and interpretation of the tests are Fisherian, and some care is needed in the
interpretation of test outcomes.
A chief distinction between M-S testing and NP testing is the role
played by the statistical model. For an NP test, the statistical model must
be statistically adequate for it to guide the interpretation of test outcomes.
It is this feature that allows one to draw positive evidential conclusions both
in the case where the null hypothesis is accepted and in the case where it is
rejected, with regard to those hypotheses that are tested with high severity
(see Mayo and Spanos 2006). But the role of the statistical model in M-S
testing is different, as it serves only to allow for the development of tests that
potentially have high power in testing the null model (the assumed model
of the original inference) against alternatives in a particular direction. In
our example, we may have a t-test that tests the null model postulating
independence with potentially high power against alternatives postulating
some degree of Markov dependence. This high power is potential in the sense
that our determination of the power of the test relies on the encompassing
model, which in Fisherian mode we allow may be false.
Suppose, then, that the null model passes this test. We then can say
that, at least as far as the direction of departure from the null that is tested
with high power is concerned, we have evidence that the null model is not
deficient. This supports at least the provisional endorsement of the power
assessments of the M-S test. Our next step may be to consider other possible
directions of departure, by turning to our assumptions regarding dependence
or heterogeneity, for example, or by looking for higher order dependence. If
the null model passes such a series of M-S tests, then, insofar as we believe
that we have ruled out all of the relevant ways in which that model fails,
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we may also believe our power calculations for the M-S tests used, because
the null model is contained by all of its encompassing models. We may
in fact be in a position to say that we have reliable evidence, not only for
the hypothesis for which we claimed evidence in the original inference, but
also for the statistical model on which that original reliability assessment
depended. In this way, we have secured our original evidence claim by
strengthening the support for our original premises.
Things look rather different if the null model fails this M-S test. In an
NP test, data that leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis can potentially
be interpreted as evidence supporting the alternative, or some subset of the
alternative in the case of a compound alternative. In M-S testing, this is
not the case. In the absence of support for the null model, the adequacy
of the encompassing model is also called into question. Thus, rejecting the
null in an M-S test that was designed to have power against alternatives
in a particular direction “simply points the direction one should search for
a better model” (Spanos, personal communication). Such information is
useful for purposes of respecifying the assumed model. The methodology of
respecification goes beyond the scope of the present paper. For our purposes
it suffices to note that any such respecified model will itself need to be tested
before it can be securely employed.
The contrast with the Huber/Hampel approach can now be seen quite
clearly, if we consider the situation of the researcher who seeks to draw infer-
ences from a body of data using some statistical model. Supposing an initial
model to be postulated, perhaps on the basis of a combination of plausibil-
ity and convenience considerations, the researcher is then faced with the
problem that, for all she knows, that model might well be wrong. The
Huber/Hampel approach would have her consider a range of epistemically
possible error scenarios in which the postulated model is wrong, and then
seek an estimator or test statistic that would allow her to draw weaker evi-
dential conclusions that would remain sound across that range, as opposed
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to the stronger (but possibly false) conclusions that could be drawn using a
procedure that is optimal for the postulated model. The M-S approach, by
contrast, would advise the researcher to subject the posulated model to a
series of tests against epistemically possible errors in particular directions.
Such testing would lead either to the validation of the postulated model,
or to the respecification of the posulated model, whereupon the M-S proce-
dure would be reiterated, until at length a model would be specified that
would withstand and be validated by such testing. By thus strengthening
the support for the model employed, one would be in a position to derive
the strongest possible conclusion from the data compatible with one’s own
reliability standards.
However one views the relative merits of Huber/Hampel robustness
theory vs. the M-S tesing approach, it is clear that the context for both
belongs to the stage of inquiry in which one is engaged, not in the use of
a reliable inferential process, but in the scrutiny, relative to one’s epistemic
situation, of the possible modes of error for the assessment of such a process’s
reliability. For an advocate of the ES theory of evidence, which employs re-
liability as the core objective and unrelativized notion behind the evidential
relationship, either approach could be used to enhance security as a mode
of evidential assessment that is relativized to epistemic situation. Thus,
both the application of robustness theory and the M-S testing methodol-
ogy belong to that stage of inquiry that is sometimes referred to as “model
criticism,” which can be described in terms of a shift of perspective on the
part of the investigator from “tentative sponsor to tentative critic” (Box
and Tiao 1973, 8). In neither approach discussed here is model criticism
carried out blindly, but rather rests upon a prior reflection on what is and
is not known about the possible sources and modes of error in an initial set
of assumptions.
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6 What next?
It should be clear by now that the most pressing problem for any attempt
to theorize systematically about security is the relevance problem: When
making an evidence claim, an agent need not worry equally about all the
ways in which she might err. There are possibilities of error, after all, that
are quite remote, and as Peirce pointed out long ago, the mere possibility
of error is not by itself grounds for genuine doubt.13 A sensible approach to
evaluating the security of evidence claims would seem to call for some sort
of ranking of which scenarios most demand scrutiny.
Here it must be acknowledged that the Bayesian enjoys an advantage.
The Bayesian apparatus comes equipped already with a measure over a set
of propositions, and isn’t that just what is needed?
Before proceeding to take up this question, let me hasten to note
that I do not propose here to consider the merits of an overall Bayesian
approach to scientific evidence. From the outset this discussion has been
concerned with articulating a more complete epistemological understanding
of ES evidence and how it is evaluated. Not only is the Bayesian account
(whether subjective or objective) not compatible with ES account, it is not
any kind of reliable indicator view of evidence, in the frequentist sense of
reliability here considered.
So the question for the present discussion is really whether an advocate
of an ES view of evidence should adopt a supplementary Bayesian framework
for the evaluation of evidence claims from the perspective of the epistemic
agent, as called for in section two?
Here there are two routes one might contemplate: the subjective or
the objective understanding of Bayesian probability. The first does such
13Indeed, it is important to note that a policy of withholding evidence claims unless
all possible ways of going wrong have been eliminated would introduce a new form of
unreliability : one would, with probability one, fail to infer a correct hypothesis from any
data, no matter how compelling (see Mayo 1996; Staley 2008).
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conceptual violence to the ES framework that is our starting point, that an
ES advocate should reject it outright. The latter, objective approach, might
be made compatible with the ES approach, if confined to this secondary
evaluative role, but brings along its own foundational difficulties.
The subjective Bayesian approach would presumably be to weight
the error-scenarios according to the agent’s personal probabilities for those
scenarios. Suppose that investigator S makes an evidence claim on the
basis that a particular hypothesis H has passed a severe test. On this
view, such a claim would be justified for S, even in the absence of any
testing of the assumed model of the test, and even though that model made
rather strong and possibly false assumptions, simply on the grounds that S
attaches only a negligible degree of belief to any of the scenarios in which the
assumed model is false. This should have little appeal for the ES advocate
who holds the truth conditions for evidence claims to be objective matters
of fact independent of belief, since it juxtaposes a strongly objective view
of the content of evidence claims with a strongly subjective view of their
justification. By contrast, the security concept here advocated, although
it is relativized to an epistemic situation, is nonetheless objective insofar
as what is epistemically possible relative to an epistemic situation is an
objective matter, at least in the sense of depending on what an epistemic
agent knows. (Here I do assume that there is more to knowing than simply
believing very strongly. At a minimum, to know that p requires that p is
true.)
Turning to objective versions of Bayesianism, things look rather dif-
ferent. Indeed, beyond just compatibility, there might even seem to be a
family resemblance between security and logical probability. Just as an evi-
dence claim is secure to the extent that it is true over all the scenarios that
are possible relative to an epistemic situation, logical probability has often
been framed in terms of the satisfaction of a formula by a class of models
consistent with a certain body of background knowledge. Thus one might
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entertain a kind of two-probability approach like Carnap’s (1962) in order
to rank those scenarios that are “most compatible” with a given epistemic
situation.
This challenge raises problems that cannot be satisfactorily addressed
in a brief discussion. Let me for now simply observe that, whatever the
advantages of such approach, it amounts to a multiplication of foundational
challenges, insofar as one adds the notorious problems of fixing a prior dis-
tribution, determining a likelihood for the catchall, etc., to whatever concep-
tual problems might be raised for frequentists. It is hard enough to defend
one interpretation of probability!
Better, then, to follow the examples of the model criticism approaches
surveyed here. One can, like the robustness theorists, try to “break off” par-
ticular categories of error-scenarios that can be represented in way that al-
lows them to be treated more or less rigorously. One can furthermore, as the
M-S approach advises, extend frequentist modes of testing to those modes
of insecurity that relate directly to the assumptions (involving distributions,
independence, and homogeneity) that define statistical models.
However, let us not stop there. Robust statistics emphasizes the read-
ily quantifiable aspects of security appraisal. As important as this is, investi-
gators also must, and often do, reflect on possible errors that are not readily
quantifiable in this way. Furthermore, possibilities of error that cannot be
approached quantitatively may nevertheless be approached systematically.
Returning to Deborah Mayo’s Error and the Growth of Knowledge, she there
called for the articulation of “canonical models of error” (Mayo 1996, e.g.,
450–51). By now we have seen how, in addition the canonical parametric
models so commonly used in statistical data analysis, robustness theorists
introduced additional canonical models of how those models might be vio-
lated, to facilitate the investigation of the behavior (whether asymptotic or
finite) of various estimators.
But just as there are qualitative, “informal” approaches to testing a
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hypothesis reliably (as when we give our students a test that it would be
hard for them to pass if they did not know the material), so there are ways
to secure our conclusions from severe tests that are not readily modeled in
a mathematical framework (such as when we space out their desks, thus se-
curing our estimate of the severity of the test based on its difficulty against
defeat due to cheating). To advance the cause of such informal, qualitative
efforts at securing our evidence claims, it may be less important to develop
sophisticated mathematical theories, and more important to reflect, as ex-
perimentalists have always done, on a kind of typology of causes of error
in different kinds of experimental undertakings. This kind of enterprise has
been joined by a handful of philosophers, pursuing various philosophical
agendas. A concern with the security of evidence might provide a setting in
which the work of various philosophers of science who have not embraced
error-statistics can be seen as nonetheless contributing to it (see, e.g., Hon
1998; 2003; Franklin 1986; 2002; Schickore 2005, among others).
However, for such categorization to constitute a real advance, I pro-
pose that we not rest content with compiling a kind of catalogue of types
of errors – rather the goal should be render such a catalogue useful for the
planning of experiment and the appraisal of experimental evidence. As in
the example of robustness theory, this requires that we not merely consider
the causes of error, but also its effects, and that we seek to draw general
conclusions about those.
7 Appendix
7.1 The weak topology and distance measures
Suppose that Ω denotes a topological space (i.e., a set on which a function d
is defined such that for any two points in Ω the four conditions on a distance
function given above are satisfied) that is complete (every Cauchy sequence
in Ω is convergent) and separable (Ω has a dense countable subset), and
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that B is the Borel-σ-algebra on Ω (i.e., the σ-algebra generated by the
open subsets of Ω). Let M be the space of all probability measures on
(Ω,B).
Supposing that F and G are distribution functions, the Le´vy distance
between F and G is defined to be
dL(F,G) ≡ inf{|∀xF (x− )−  ≤ G(x) ≤ F (x+ ) + }. (9)
Next, suppose that F and G are two probability measures in M . The
Prohorov distance between F and G is defined to be
dP (F,G) = inf{ > 0|F{A} ≤ g{A + forallA ∈ B}. (10)
Here A is the closed -neighborhood of subset A ⊂ Ω, defined as
A ≡ {x ∈ Ω| inf
y∈A
d(x, y) ≤ }. (11)
Finally, suppose that the distance function d in Ω is bounded by 1 (other-
wise, replace d with d′ = d(x, y)/[1 + d(x, y)] to obtain a distance function
so bounded). Then consider the class Ψ of all functions ψ satisfying the
Lipschitz condition: |ψ(x) − ψ(y)| ≤ d(x, y). The bounded Lipschitz metric
is then defined as:
dBL(F,G) = sup
ψ∈Ψ
|
∫
ψdF −
∫
ψdG|. (12)
7.2 Definitions of IF-related concepts and breakdown point
Suppose that T is an estimator and F a distribution. Then the gross-error
sensitivity for (T, F ) is defined as:
γ∗(T, F ) = sup
x
|IFT,F (x)| (13)
The local-shift sensitivity for (T, F ) is defined as:
λ∗(T, F ) = sup
x 6=y
|IFT,F (y)− IFT,F (x)|/|y − x| (14)
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Finally, the rejection point for (T, F ) is defined as:
ρ∗(T, F ) = inf{r > 0; IFT,F (x) = 0 when |x| > r} (15)
Suppose that F and G are distributions in sample space X , {Tn} is
a sequence of estimators, and Θ is a parameter space (e.g., the real number
line R). Then the breakdown point ∗ of {Tn} at F is defined as:
∗ ≡ sup{ ≤ 1; there is a compact set K $ Θ such that
dP (F,G) <  implies G({Tn ∈ K}) n→∞→ 1}. (16)
Here dP (F,G) is the Prohorov distance between the distributions F and G.
A finite-sample definition of the breakdown point involving no reference to
probability distributions was introduced by Donoho and Huber (1983; see
also Rousseeuw and Leroy 2003, 9-12). It is worth noting that an advantage
of the breakdown point over the influence function is that it is defined for
all estimators, whereas the IF is not.
7.3 The Normal autoregressive model and testing indepen-
dence
As noted above, the optimal test of independence against Markov depen-
dence within the Normal autoregressive model is a t-test. The test statistic
for such a test is defined as τ(X) =
√
T (αˆ1)
s , where αˆ1 =
PT
t=1(Xt−X¯)(Xt−1−X¯)PT
t=1(Xt−1−X¯)2
,
s2 = 1T−2
∑T
t=1(Xt − αˆ0 − αˆ1Xt−1)2, αˆ0 = X¯ − αˆ1X¯−1, X¯ = 1T
∑T
t=1Xt,
and X¯−1 = 1T−1
∑T−1
t=1 Xt. Under the null hypothesis, the quantity τ(X) is
asymptotically approximated by Student’s t-distribution with n− 2 degrees
of freedom.
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